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Resumo
A Verificação e a Implementação Nacional de 
Instru mentos Internacionais de Não-Proliferação 
Nuclear e Security
Os esforços conjuntos internacionais para lidar e miti-
gar o risco de má utilização nuclear resultaram numa 
expansão do número de instrumentos que são apeli-
dados de regime nuclear global. Este artigo examina o 
papel assumido por alguns dos principais instrumen-
tos internacionais na área nuclear, em particular o 
Trata do de Não-Prolife ração Nuclear e a Resolução 
nº1540 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas 
na gestão da proli feração e segurança nuclear. Concre-
tamente, introduz e explica os conceitos de verificação 
e implementação nacional como importantes compo-
nentes dos regimes de controlo nuclear e aborda o 
papel que estes têm para garantir que os Estados cum-
prem as suas obrigações internacionais. Examinam-se 
ainda alguns dos mecanismos de verifi cação e medi-
das de implementação nacional desenvolvidas por 
estes instrumentos e a forma como operam.
Abstract
Collective international efforts to address and mitigate 
the risk of nuclear misuse have resulted in an expand-
ing body of instruments that can be called the global 
nuclear regime. This article examines the role played by 
some of the major international instruments in the 
nuclear field particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proli-
feration of Nuclear Weapons and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 in addressing nuclear proliferation 
and security. In particular, it introduces and explains 
the concepts of verification and national implementa-
tion as important components of nuclear control 
regimes and addresses the role they play in ensuring 
that states are abiding by their international obliga-
tions. Specifically, the article examines some of the 
verification mechanisms and national implementation 
measures developed for these instruments, and dis-
cusses how they operate.
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Introduction
Efforts to control the destructive potential of nuclear technology started shortly 
after the scientific and technical breakthroughs that highlighted the benefits but 
also risks associated with the use of nuclear energy. Collective international efforts 
to address and mitigate the risk of nuclear misuse have resulted in an expanding 
body of instruments that can be called the global nuclear regime. This constitutes a 
wide array of instruments including treaties, protocols, UN resolutions, formal and 
informal arrangements and codes of conduct that are both growing in number and 
sophistication. The ultimate purpose of these instruments is to impose some order 
on the risks associated with the use of nuclear energy. Two issues in particular 
ga ined prominence internationally: nuclear proliferation and nuclear security.
Horizontal nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to new 
countries resulting in an increase in the total number of states in possession of these 
weapons. This has been identified as an international problem very early on in the 
nuclear age and various international efforts have been directed at addressing it 
(Goldblat, 2002: 148). The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), which entered into force in 1970, is widely considered as the most pro minent 
international non-proliferation instrument.
However, it predominantly addresses states while, to a large extent, ignoring the 
role of non-state actors in nuclear proliferation. Public revelations of clandestine 
nuclear supply networks did much to focus the attention on the problem. In 2004, 
the Security Council therefore acted to plug this perceived gap. It adopted reso-
lution 1540 which addresses the threat caused by the illegal access, trafficking and 
proliferation by non-states actors of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) 
we apons, as well as their means of delivery and related materials.
Nuclear security “focuses on the prevention of, detection of, and response to, crimi-
nal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other 
radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities” (IAEA, 2013: 
para. 1.1).1 Such malicious acts could involve attempts by a terrorist group to make 
a nuclear explosive device with nuclear material, or an improvised radiological 
dispersal device with a radioactive source, thereby contributing to the proliferation 
of such weapons. Other acts which nuclear security measures aim to combat, 
include theft, sabotage, illicit trafficking or illegal transfer of nuclear or other radio-
active material. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 
1540) can be considered as an important breakthrough moment in how the interna-
tional community address the challenges of keeping nuclear materials and facilities 
1 “Associated activities” are “the possession, production, processing, use, storage, handling, 
dispo sal or transport of nuclear material or other radioactive material” (IAEA, 2013: 11).
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secure.2 Other instruments addressing various aspects of nuclear security are also 
relevant for the objectives of the resolution.3
This article examines the role played by some of the major international instru-
ments in the nuclear field particularly the NPT and UNSCR 1540 in addressing 
nuclear proliferation and security. In particular, it introduces and explains the con-
cepts of verification and national implementation as important components of 
nuclear control regimes and addresses the role they play in ensuring that states are 
abiding by their international obligations. Specifically, the article examines some of 
the verification mechanisms and national implementation measures developed by 
these instruments, and discusses how they operate.
Verification of International Instruments
What is Verification and What Role Does it Play?
Verification can be defined in a general way as the establishment of truth or 
co rrectness by examination or demonstration. Mechanisms of verification have 
been developed in many fields and they are used in different varieties in auditing, 
academic peer-reviews, courts and many other activities where evidence collec-
tion is systematically pursued to reach an independent judgement about some-
thing that is presented as a fact.
2 It should be noted that UNSCR 1540 focuses on nuclear weapons which utilize nuclear material 
but does not explicitly address the proliferation of radiological dispersal devices which utilize 
radioactive material. Nuclear security, however, aims to prevent, detect and respond to acts 
directed not only at nuclear but also other radioactive material.
3 The 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the IAEA Code of 
Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources are explicitly mentioned in the 
preamble of UNSCR 1540. Other relevant instruments include the 2005 International Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the 2010 Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, the 1988 Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation as amended by 
the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation, and the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf as amended by the Protocol of 
2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf. For a detailed presentation of the relevant instruments for 
nuclear security, see for instance IAEA (2011). “The International Legal Framework for Nuclear 
Security”. Nuclear Law Series No.4. Vienna: IAEA; C. Stoiber (2010). Nuclear Security: Legal 
Aspects of Physical Protection, Combating Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Terrorism. In Nuclear 
Energy Agency, ed. 2010. Author?? International Nuclear Law: History, Evolution and Outlook, 
10th Anniversary of the International School of Nuclear Law. Paris: OECD Publications, pp. 219-242.
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Verification has, over time, become a common practice in international affairs and 
developed into one of the main issues in the field of arms control and non-proli-
feration. Whether during negotiations, drafting or implementation, verification 
occupies a prominent place in all stages of arms control (Gallagher, 1997:138-140). 
The reason behind the growing salience of verification in arms control and 
non-proliferation is not hard to imagine.
The end of the Cold War resulted in a considerable expansion of bilateral and multi-
lateral arrangements and agreements that addressed the vast stockpiles of weapons 
then deemed excessive in Post Cold War order (Nye, 1989: 51-55). However, because 
states consider armaments and military capabilities as central to their national 
security, having access to verification became increasingly important to ensure that 
no party is cheating and in the process gaining some military advantage over other 
abiding parties (Meyer, 1984: 111-24). While verification was practiced during the 
Cold War and may even have much older roots in earlier arms control practices, it 
was the fast expansion of arms control in the 90s and disappearance of Soviet objec-
tions to on-site inspections that opened the door wide open to significant expansion 
in international verification activities. (Dunn et al, 1990: 198)
A group of governmental experts convened by the UN defined arms control verifi-
cation as the ‘process in which data are collected, collated and analysed in order to 
make an informed judgment as to whether a party is complying with its obliga-
tions.’ (UN, 1995: 15) For verification to be credible, it requires an impartial and 
objective assessment of available evidence through a rigorous process to reach a 
final judgement. Traditionally verification has been done either by common 
arrangements between parties to an agreement or delegated to an international 
organisation like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Organi-
sation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In all cases, the under-
lying assumption is that whatever a country declares should not be taken at face 
value but should be subjected to examination.
In this context verification serves three main functions. It provides tools to detect 
non-compliance of states with their obligations (UNIDIR, 2003: 2-3). Effective veri-
fication regimes emphasise the importance of accurate and timely detection to limit 
any advantages that can be accrued from cheating. In addition to detection, verifi-
cation also has a deterrence function. If cheating will be detected and announced, 
states might choose to hold to their obligations. In addition to the above, verifica-
tion allows states to demonstrate their compliance in an open, official and systema-
tic way which can build confidence in the value of cooperation between states.
Verifying Non-Proliferation: the Case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is one of the most widely adhered to internatio-
nal treaties and for many years has become a central component of the international 
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nuclear order. The treaty entered into force in 1970 after a long process of negotia-
tions in the previous decade and is widely acknowledged to rely on three pillars: 
nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation 
(Dhanapala, 2010: 6)
To verify the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty, Article III requires 
non-nuclear weapons states to apply nuclear safeguards. To that end, and over 
the years, a sophisticated system for verification has developed to address the 
non-proliferation obligations under the treaty.
The IAEA was entrusted as an independent international organisation to verify the 
non-proliferation under the NPT. The IAEA was established in 1957, long before the 
NPT entered into force, and already had a limited system of safeguards that was 
developed in the context of the rise of interest in nuclear technology and trade in 
the 50s (Fischer, 1997: 243). The NPT significantly expanded this system and intro-
duced the concept of ‘Comprehensive Safeguards’. They were called ‘comprehen-
sive’ because of the break they made with earlier safeguards applied by the Agency 
and that were restricted to certain facilities, items or materials.
States under comprehensive safeguards undertake to establish an internal system 
to account for and control nuclear material and designate a national authority for 
this purpose. For the purpose of safeguards, such material includes enriched ura-
nium, plutonium and uranium-233 all of which can be used as fissile materials for 
nuclear explosive devices (IAEA, 2007: 8). Internal accounting measures also cover 
natural and depleted uranium. Using the information collected by their internal 
systems of accountancy, states then provide the IAEA with periodic reports on their 
nuclear holdings and according to a defined schedule.
It is the task of the IAEA then to check the information provided in state declara-
tions to look for discrepancies and inconsistencies. The IAEA also routinely sends 
inspectors, according to specified procedures, to examine nuclear material balances 
and that nuclear facilities are of the design declared and reported by the state and 
operate accordingly. State declarations and IAEA inspections form the core of 
nuclear non-proliferation verification activities.
Over the years, new instruments were added to the safeguards tool box to enhance 
the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards. In 1974, a protocol was conceived 
to reduce the verification burden for states with limited nuclear infrastructure 
which was amended in 2005 and called ‘Small Quantities Protocol.’ In 1997, the 
IAEA introduced the ‘Additional Protocol’ which provided the IAEA with addi-
tional legal authority to enhance its verification activities through increased repor-
ting and enhanced access for agency inspections (Hirsch, 2004: 140).
A process of examination and evaluation of state reports and inspection outcomes 
follows and ends with the IAEA drawing conclusions on the state of nuclear activi-
ties in each country and depending on which safeguards instruments a state has in 
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place. Strong assurances are provided for states with both comprehensive safe-
guards agreement and an additional protocol in force. When no discrepancy or 
inconsistency is discovered by the IAEA, it reports that no nuclear material was 
diverted to military purposes and the absence of undeclared material. For countries 
with only a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force, the agency pro-
vides more limited assurances that cover only non-diversion of declared materials 
(IAEA, 2011: 11).
IAEA safeguards are considered one of the most important international verifica-
tion regimes in practice but it is one that is not without its challenges. The early 
nineties was a time when some shortcoming of the regime became clear. Despite 
IAEA safeguards, Iraq and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programmes went 
largely undetected (Rockwood, 2002: 125-126). This was one of the reasons why the 
Agency developed enhanced verification tools including the Additional Protocol. 
Currently, differences about Iran’s nuclear capabilities continue to highlight the 
sensitivity and challenges that face effective implementation of safeguards.
Furthermore, some of the safeguards tools remain underutilized due to political 
sensitivities or convenience. CSAs gives the IAEA the right to invoke ‘special 
inspections’ when there are grounds to suspect prohibited activities are taking 
place in undeclared locations. Over almost four decades, this tool has only been 
invoked twice (Acton et al, 2009)
Further development and evolution of safeguards seems to continuously bring 
into light the tension between the sovereignty of nation-states and the need for 
greater access and transparency that are needed for effective verification. Contro-
versies surrounding how open source information can be used by IAEA in its 
verifi cation activities and differences over introducing state level approaches to 
safeguards are clear examples of these tensions. Yet despite the challenges and 
diffe rences, IAEA safeguards continue to play a major and important role in bring-
ing up, addressing and managing compliance to the non-proliferation obligations 
under the NPT.
Monitoring Implementation of Nuclear Security Obligations: the Case of 
UNSCR 1540
Resolution 1540 was significant in many ways. The resolution’s adoption under 
Chapter VII permits the Security Council to use its enforcement powers to give 
effect to its decisions in the resolution. Moreover, by requiring states to enact 
ce rtain domestic legislation, the resolution has used the legislative rather than the 
more commonly-used executive function of the Council (Buffer et al, 2008: 71) 
However, how can states, the UN Security Council or the international commu-
nity ensure that obligations brought about by the resolution are being carried out 
by all states?
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In absence of a dedicated international body that can take up this task, resolution 
1540 established a special committee called the 1540 Committee. Operative 
paragra ph four of the resolution identifies as the main task of the Committee its 
duty to report to the Council on the state of implementation of the resolution. This 
provides for a mechanism to monitor the state of implementation of the resolution 
and provides the Council with the tools through which it can later determine 
complian ce (Crail, 2006: 360). The Committee includes all members of the UN 
Security Council and is assisted in its work by the UN Secretariat and a group of 
international experts.
The Committee’s initial mandate was for two years reflecting a predisposition for 
a short-term ad-hoc monitoring mechanism. However, through subsequent reso-
lutions the mandate of the Committee was extended until 2021 and its role in 
suppor ting and assisting implementation became increasingly prominent.
The resolution asks all states to submit national reports to the Committee about 
their implementation of the resolution. To harmonise these reports, the Committee 
produced a set of reporting guidelines. National reports are later collected, colla-
ted and analysed by the Committee (UN, 2006: 8).
For its internal purposes the Committee produced a matrix which operationalises 
the various obligations under the resolution into distinct practical activities (Allen 
et al, 2007: 7) The Committee then uses information contained in national 
im plementation reports in addition to publicly available information to identify 
what steps were taken by each country and where the gaps might still exist. (UN, 
2006: 8) In some cases, the Committee would ask a state to clarify or update the 
information it provided in its national report making the process of data collection 
and assessment interactive.
General conclusions derived from these activities are later reported to the Security 
Council for consideration. The Committee submitted reports that addressed 
monito ring of implementation to the Security in 2006, 2008 and 2011. Since 2011 
the Committee provides annual reports to the Council on the state of implemen-
tation of the resolution.
While the Committee plays an important role in monitoring implementation and 
providing assistance to states, some can argue that its role falls short of tra-
ditional verification as for example practiced by the IAEA and other organi-
sations. The Committee assesses and reports on information it receives from 
states in their national reports but so far has nothing like the intrusive inspection 
mechanisms available for other regimes and which enable a thorough imple-
mentation assessment.
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National Implementation of International Instruments4
What is National Implementation and Why is it Important?
National implementation follows a “self-evident” principle according to which 
“a state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its 
legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the 
obligations undertaken” (PCIJ, 1925: 20). It may consist in adopting more than a 
general constitutional clause making relevant international legal obligations 
directly applicable in national law: the instruments for non-proliferation and 
nuclear security require the adoption of detailed provisions and “are only enfor-
ceable at the national level if they are effectively implemented through laws and 
regu lations” (Spence, 2012: 97).
While national implementation is an obligation, there are also considerable benefits 
to be gained from it. With appropriate legislation in place, in line with international 
requirements, states can investigate, prosecute and punish any offences involving 
nuclear and radiological weapons, as well as their related material. That may in 
itself serve as a deterrent against such acts. Also, with appropriate laws and regu-
lations, states can exercise proper control over nuclear and other radioactive mate-
rial and radioactive sources, including their production, storage, use, transport, 
import and export. By putting legislative measures in place, national security and 
public health and safety will thus be enhanced.
National Implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The implementation of the NPT and related safeguards obligations encompass 
three main types of measures: prohibitions, implementation of safeguards agreements (in 
particular a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material) and export and 
import controls.
Articles I and II of the treaty prohibit a number of activities which states un dertake 
not to commit. They could additionally decide to criminalize those activities in 
their national laws. For nuclear-weapon states, those include the transfer to any 
recipient of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and assisting, encoura-
ging, or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices. Non-nuclear-weapon states should prohibit the 
4 Parts of this section are a condensed version of the following article: S. Drobysz (2014). “A New 
Legal Tool for States: the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security” in 
Mariano Manóvil (ed.), Nuclear Law in Progress: Derecho Nuclear en Evolucion, XXI AIDN/INLA 
Congress – Buenos Aires 2014. Buenos Aires: Legis Argentina, pp. 569-592.
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receipt of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as well as the 
receipt of control over such weapons or devices directly, or indirectly; the manu-
facture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and the seeking or 
receipt of any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.
The application of safeguards obligations, as provided for in Article III.1 of the 
NPT, comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, requires the 
adoption of a legislative and regulatory system “providing for oversight and mana-
gement of nuclear material and activities” (IAEA, 2012: 9) and enabling the IAEA’s 
verification activities. The national legal framework should clarify what safeguards 
apply to, by defining “nuclear material” in line with the CSA. Further, it should 
provide for the following elements: creation of a national authority responsible for 
the proper application of the safeguards agreement, a system to account for and 
control nuclear material, licensing requirements for the use, handling, transfer and 
other activities involving nuclear material, obligations of the licensees with respect 
to safeguards implementation such as the maintenance of records, performance of 
measurements of nuclear material, submission of reports. Additionally, arrange-
ments for supporting and facilitating verification activities conducted by the IAEA 
should be provided for.5
Finally, Article III.2 of the treaty forbids states parties to provide to any non-nu-
clear-weapon state source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material 
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special 
fissionable material for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable 
material is subject to the safeguards. Comprehensive safeguards agreements and 
additional protocols also require states to report certain exports and imports. The 
national legal framework should therefore comprise specific export and import 
legislation, including appropriate lists of material, equipment and technology 
su bject to export and import controls, as well as provisions for the licensing of 
exports and imports.
National Implementation of UNSCR 1540 and other Nuclear Security Instruments
The measures to be adopted by states under UNSCR 1540 and other nuclear 
securi ty instruments can be presented under two main pillars: on the one hand, 
5 On the national implementation measures for safeguards, see IAEA (2012). Guidance for States 
Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. Service Series 
No. 21. Vienna: IAEA, p. 9; VERTIC (2013). National Implementation Measures for the 1968 Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). VERTIC Fact Sheet 5; C. Stoiber et al (2003). Handbook on Nuclear 
Law. Vienna: IAEA; C. Stoiber et al. (2010). Handbook on Nuclear Law, Implementing Legislation. 
Vienna: IAEA, Chapter 12.
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prohibitions and criminalization of acts related to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to non-state actors, the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive 
material and nuclear terrorism as well appropriate criminal proceedings for those 
offences, and on the other hand, measures for the prevention of the commission of 
such acts.
But first, key terms such as “non-state actors”, “nuclear material”, “radioactive 
material”, “radioactive sources”, “nuclear facility” should be defined in the national 
legal framework, as they determine the scope of application of the national imple-
mentation measures. The definitions must be in line with what the resolution and 
conventions provide for.
Penal measures should then be adopted too. Operative paragraph 2 of UNSCR 1540 
requires all states, in accordance with their national procedures, to “adopt and 
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufac-
ture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear (…) weapons and 
their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to 
engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, 
assist or finance them”. Other international instruments for nuclear security addi-
tionally provide for specific offences and adequate penalties.6 The national criminal 
procedure should enable the effective investigation and prosecution of the offences, 
and provide for specific international cooperation measures.
Another set of national implementation measures aims to prevent the commission 
of prohibited activities, under the terms of operative paragraph 3 of UNSCR 1540, 
that requires the establishment of domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appro-
priate controls over related materials. Such domestic controls encompass measures 
similar to those adopted for the implementation of the NPT and safeguards 
ag reements. They start with the national regulation of activities involving nuclear 
material, other radioactive material and radioactive sources. That includes the 
establishment of a competent authority responsible for the regulation of nuclear 
activities.7 A licensing system to ensure that no person can carry out activities 
involving nuclear material, radioactive material or radioactive sources without a 
license should also be put in place, as well as measures for the verification of com-
pliance with applicable requirements.8
6 See for instance the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 
Amendment (Articles 7(1)), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (Articles 2 and 5).
7 As required for instance in Article 2A (2)(b) of the amended CPPNM.
8 See in that sense Article 2A (3), Fundamental Principle C of the CPPNM/A; paragraphs 19 (c) 
and (h), 20(h), 22(i) of the Code of Conduct.
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International instruments for nuclear security also require that measures be 
adopted to account for and protect nuclear (see UNSCR 1540, operative para-
graph 3 (a) and (b)) and other radioactive material. Regarding nuclear material, 
Article 2A (1) of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material provides that each state party shall “establish, implement and maintain 
an appropriate physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and 
nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction”. Article 8 of the International Convention 
on the Suppression for Acts of Nuclear Terrorism contains a similar obligation 
regarding radioactive material, providing that “for purposes of preventing 
offences under this Convention, states parties shall make every effort to adopt 
appropriate measures to ensure the pro tection of radioactive material, taking into 
account relevant recommendations and functions of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency.”
Finally, the export, import, transit, trans-shipment of nuclear and other radioactive 
material should be regulated, as required for instance by operative paragraph 3 (d) 
of UNSCR 1540 and Article 4 of the CPPNM.
Process and Challenges of National Implementation
A number of measures thus need to be adopted in the national legal framework to 
give full effect to the international instruments for nuclear non-proliferation and 
security. Doing so nevertheless requires significant efforts and can prove very 
challen ging even for the most capable national governments.
The complexity of the international legal framework itself complicates the task. 
Contrary to other fields of international law, nuclear non-proliferation and 
se curity are not governed by one single convention but by multiple instruments. 
States will therefore have to put considerable effort into identifying relevant 
instruments and obligations and consolidating them. Moreover, the complex 
framework can gene rate “issues of consistent interpretation and effective 
im plementation by national authorities and international organisations” (Stoiber, 
2010: 240).
National circumstances must also be taken into account. There is not a “one size 
fits all” process to follow to adopt the wide range of national implementation 
measures discussed above. States may decide to adopt a single standalone and 
comprehensive nuclear law, multiple nuclear-related laws, or follow a diffused 
approach leaving implementation across various laws and regulations including 
penal codes, laws on export-import, laws on the transport of dangerous goods, 
laws on health, etc.
A “diffused” approach to national implementation, however, may add to the pro-
blem of harmonization, by increasing the risk of inconsistency, repetition and 
“confusing cross-referencing of provisions in different laws” (Stoiber, 2012: 12). 
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Ad ditionally, as nuclear legislation concerns a number of different legal and 
te chnical areas, many actors are usually involved in the drafting process and they 
do not necessarily have the same level of understanding of the issues at stake; 
co ordination of their participation can be difficult to organize (Stoiber, 2012: 13). 
Other obstacles to national implementation, identified by the IAEA with regard to 
the CPPNM Amendment, include the possible “deficiency in the legal and techni-
cal expertise and financial resources needed, particularly, for the full and effective 
implementation of the Amendment, such as legislative drafting” (Johnson, 2014: 
552). The Agency also noted, “although many CPPNM States Parties support the 
Amendment in principle, a need to deal with other more pressing priorities was 
highlighted” (Johnson, 2014: 552). The same holds true for other instruments for 
non-proliferation and security.
Conclusion: Strengthening Verification and Implementation
International instruments play an important role in controlling sensitive and 
dual-use technologies to ensure that these technologies are only dedicated to 
peaceful uses. They create global frameworks through which common threats 
and risks can be mitiga ted and addressed. The NPT and UNSCR 1540, discussed 
in this article, are pro minent examples of how these instruments have evolved 
into sophisticated and complex international regimes. They create legally binding 
commitments for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prevention, 
detection and response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or 
directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or 
associated activities.
Yet, the ability of these instruments to achieve their full promise depends in large 
part on the development of effective verification and implementation measures 
that translate international norms and commitments into accountable actions. 
The development of effective and impartial international verification capabilities 
that are regularly updated to incorporate the latest in verification technologies is 
vital to ensure that cases of non-compliance are detected in a timely and accurate 
manner or even deterred before they occur. New notions of state sovereignty 
should accommodate increasing intrusiveness of international verification. It is 
also the responsibility of the international community to insist on high standards 
of verification that emphasize objectivity, professionalism and lack of political 
bias. More efforts also need to be directed to compliance-determining and enfor-
cement mechanisms to ensure that verification conclusions are acted upon in a 
swift and unequivocal way to enhance the credibility of these international 
instruments.
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Full and effective implementation of instruments for non-proliferation and nuclear 
security is a long-term task.9 States face different challenges when implementing 
international obligations. Their efforts can be hampered by the complex and evol-
ving nature of the international legal framework itself. The lack of adequate 
resources and the existence of other pressing national priorities may also be obsta-
cles to effective implementation. Relevant international, regional and sub-regional 
organizations as well as non-governmental organizations have a crucial role to 
play in helping to address such obstacles. They provide assistance services but 
have also developed many tools, including model laws, to help implement inter-
national instruments related to nuclear non-proliferation and security10, and their 
use should be encouraged. Building reliable international verification capabilities 
and addressing national implementation gaps are both essential components for 
any effective international framework for nuclear non-proliferation and security.
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